The most powerful tool of EU foreign policy in dealing with potential candidate countries (and beyond) is that of political conditionality. The successes of this policy, as well as its spectacular failures, have been largely well documented by the political science research community. Far less research, however, goes into explaining the scenarios where the EU goes "beyond conditionality" (Teokarevic 2003) in its dealings with potential candidates for membership in the EU. The goal of this paper is to explain the extremely intensive and pro-active EU involvement in the drafting of the Constitution of Serbia and Montenegro and the subsequent attempts by Brussels to determine the future nature of the union between these neighboring republics. In answering this question the paper looks at the history of EU's involvement in the region and attempts to provide a theoretical framework that can best provide the explanation for the motivation of EU's policy makers to utilize such a direct strategy of involvement that goes far "beyond conditionality". The conclusions of this paper are that EU went "beyond conditionality" in dealing with Serbia and Montenegro on two levels: functional and theoretical. On the functional level, EU did not employ the principle of conditionality per se. Instead of placing conditions on Serbia and Montenegro and then cajoling the two to settle their differences (both pre-State Union agreement and post-Action Plan), EU actually went in and was actively involved, "beyond conditionality", 1 A longer version of this paper was presented at
Introduction
In a 2000 Economist article, the European Union's main external relations focus and task for the near future were understood as "the avoidance of another war in the Balkans, which remains all too real a possibility." As main evidence of the possibility of another such war, the Economist article proposed that "several signs suggest that his [Milosevic's] next war could be fought over Montenegro."
2 The article goes on to suggest that the best way to prevent such a war would be to support the independently minded Montenegro. In defense of the Economist, that article was written well before the October 2000 democratic revolution that toppled the Milosevic regime. However, what the Economist article and many observers since have missed is that one of European Union's main foreign policy objectives had always been the prevention of war. The very impetus for the creation of the European Union was the fear of another war, not in the Balkans though, but rather one between France and Germany.
In general terms, this paper expands on the ability/willingness of the EU to project such a reconciliatory goal in Serbia and Montenegro and subsequently in the wider region of Western
Balkans. In particular, the goal of this paper is rather modest: to explain the extremely intensive and pro-active EU involvement in the drafting of the State Union Constitution and eventual "running" of Serbia and Montenegro. It is argued here that the former and the latter are closely related, as the Western Balkan "peace project" requires exactly that form of intensive interaction that often requires the EU to willingly undermine its own conditions and sometimes even look beyond them.
In elaborating such a pro-active approach we will have to dwell into the history of the EU's involvement in the region and also try to assess the EU policy makers' motives in utilizing such a direct strategy of involvement that goes "beyond conditionality" 3 dynamics evident in the Central Eastern European countries' (CEEC) accession process. This paper is an attempt to introduce the logic behind the dynamic of EU interaction that goes "beyond conditionality" into the lexicon of the EU enlargement studies.
The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro would have been an impossibility had it not been for the "very prominent role played by the EU" whose "proactive role in the constitutional engineering of Serbia and Montenegro far surpasses the policy model known as conditionality," as argued by Teokarevic. 4 To try to explain such EU involvement in Serbia and Montenegro and how it may have gone "beyond conditionality" we try to explain a theoretical framework that explains such a policy preference (Part I). To empirically test this theoretical model we will analyze how the EU has enacted its conditions in Serbia and Montenegro (Part II) and then attempt to offer some reasons for why it has gone "beyond conditionality" (Part III). However, it should be noted that the question of "why" EU 3 "Beyond conditionality" is a concept first introduced by Jovan Teokarevic who uses it in his article on this same subject matter, "EU Accession and the Serbian-Montenegrin Constitutional Charter" that appeared in the went beyond conditionality in Serbia and not in some other countries is difficult to answer completely.
I. Dynamics "Beyond Conditionality" -Theoretical Framework
It is necessary to situate the use of conditionality, or in this case the idea of going "beyond" it, in terms of theory. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) identify three models of how countries adopt the rules of the EU and in essence get "Europeanized": external incentives, social learning and lesson-drawing. They note that the success of democratic conditionality depends in large part on the initial conditions in the candidate countries concluding that EU's influence is the strongest in the fragile and unstable democracies, noting Serbia explicitly as an example of such a case.
In this paper, however, we are primarily trying to assess the EU motivations for proactively involving itself in the elaborate tasks of constructing a state constitution and even forgoing its own conditions in order to advance the eventual contractual relationship based on those very conditions. Which theory then best explains such a pro-active EU dynamic? This question needs to be explained from both the perspective of the EU and the specific country in question.
A unique dynamic exists in special cases where conditionality alone is insufficient or domestic variables call upon for a different mechanism of Europeanization. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that democratic conditionality is "likely to be ineffective in the case of failed states, primarily those affected by severe ethno-political conflict, such as many successor states of Yugoslavia. In the latter cases, the EU would need to go beyond reinforcement by reward and use both coercive and supportive strategies to have positive impact." 5 This paper thus looks at one example where conditionality alone does not suffice. The case of EU involvement in resolving the Serbia and Montenegro constitutional impasse is an explicit example of the EU using such "supportive strategies…beyond reinforcement by reward… to have a positive impact"
and is an empirical contribution to the theoretical dynamics uncovered by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's seminal contribution to the study of European Integration. While Serbia and
Montenegro is largely (entirely?) an example of the EU using "supportive strategies" one would not need to look much farther/further east to find "coercive strategies" as well, the main example being Lukashenko's government in Belarus.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that the export of rules and democratic conditionality do not lend to being explained through social learning and lesson-drawing. Our analysis largely agrees with that assessment, although from the EU perspective we will prove that "lesson-drawing" does explain interacting with Serbia and Montenegro "beyond reinforcement by reward", especially when seen from the historical examples of "learning" from the previous Balkan conflicts. The EU therefore has considerable interests to act so pro-actively in Serbia and Montenegro and has also "learned" to do so.]
II. How the EU Acts "Beyond Conditionality" The involvement of the EU went well "beyond conditionality" and it subscribes to the dynamic of "supportive strategies…beyond reinforcement by reward… to have a positive impact. The EU first sought pro-actively to identify the state with which it was to have contractual relationships, seeing as Montenegro at the time operated as an independent entity. 12 Teokarevic 40. 13 Tocci 563. 14 Tocci 562. -Teokarevic argues a similar point when he states that ""The agreement required considerable effort on the part of the EU -both in public and behind the scenes, including active shuttle diplomacy by Javier Solana." Teokarevic 42.
The involvement of Solana and his signing of the Constitution points to the unprecedented level of EU involvement. Once Serbia and Montenegro was identified, the conditionalities to be followed by it in its relationship with the EU were laid by the Council. This case points to an obvious conflict between the "grand-strategy" supportive strategies favored by Javier Solana and the commitment to the fulfillment of conditionalities practiced by the DG Enlargement. While SAA negotiations were finally suspended in May 2006, it took the EU considerable time to do so and even then only after significant pressure from the ICTY main prosecutor. Even once the suspension took place, Javier Solana made sure to make a public qualification that the Mladic arrest was not the main conditionality, thus further offering a supportive strategy that seeks to make the conditionality less coercive. It is very likely that under pressure from Mr. Solana and the Council of Ministers, the ICTY will eventually give Serbia a positive assessment, whether Mladic is finally captured or not. There is simply too much at stake for the EU and furthermore the above empirical examples point to a pattern of EU pro-active supportive strategy that is unlikely to stop.
III. Why the EU Acts "Beyond Conditionality"
To understand the motives for the kind of foreign policy decisions that the European Union has made in relation to Serbia and Montenegro, we must first assess the history of EU's involvement in the region (and its lesson-drawing dynamic) and then finally assess the actions and the motives of the EU.
In his main work in International Relations (IR) theory, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, Robert Jervis, using case studies from clinical psychology, tries to explain how decision makers "learn" from their past experiences. Jervis concludes that "firsthand experiences", "generational effects", "the last war" and "failures" all contribute to how decision-makers make policy decisions. 33 It is interesting how Jervis's approach can explain EU's involvement in the Western Balkans exactly because there was the "last war" EU had to directly involve itself with, with a "generation" of policymakers that went through it in the "formative years" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and an involvement that was generally perceived as a gross "failure". This paper is making an argument that the form of interaction EU is undertaking in the Western Balkans goes "beyond conditionality", especially in comparison with the Central Eastern European countries, and to understand to reasons why EU is taking such an approach it is necessary to survey the history of EU involvement in the region, as it is exactly the Balkan Wars of the 90s that are, for better of for worse, conditioning the current EU response.
Interestingly, lesson-drawing from the Balkan conflicts could also be seen as a social constructivist dynamic, especially since it essentially operates under the "logic of A note here on Jervis's work may be necessary. It was his intention to clarify how decision makers were in fact often drawing the incorrect conclusions from their past experiences and thus IR theory should not put too much credence in, or at least be highly cautious in using, rational choice. This paper is not making a normative conclusion as to whether the EU is making the "right or wrong decisions" and therefore whether they are learning the "right or wrong" lessons. It is the intent here to use Jervis's research to support the concept of historical events influencing decision makers and fashioning their response for future involvement in similar situation or in the same region. The point here is that EU "learned" something from past Balkan Wars and that "something" is fashioning its response today. Whether the EU learned the right things or whether the current policy is right, is not the scope of this paper, but may be assessed in the policy prescription part of the conclusion.
The difficult lessons of the CFSP formulation throughout the 1990s have essentially "taught" the EU to be pro-active in the region and not wait to act as a peace maker while the conflict is raging, but rather a peace guarantor. So while social constructivism is not used to explain the dynamic of EU involvement in the constitution formulation analyzed here, it might very well explain the underpinning rationale behind such an idea in the first place. It is also important to note that the line separating Jervis influenced theory of lesson-drawing and that of social constructivist "logic of appropriateness" is very blurred. All that a "generational effect" may in the end mean, for example, is a common adoption of a norm of behavior by a particular group of decision-makers, states and/or institutions.
The failure of the European powers to prevent and assuage the Balkan War by agreeing on a common policy towards the newly formed independent countries is largely responsible for the carnage that ensued across the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the warnings of the Arbitration Commission set up by the General Affairs Council of 16 December 1991 that raised serious doubts as to Croatia's respect for minority rights, the German government placed "immense pressure" on the EC, which eventually recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 th January, 1992. 34 Not only did the EU not follow its own political conditionality relating to minority rights, democracy and rule of law, but the newly formulated European Union was proven to be incapable of operating a common foreign policy with any success. EU scholar Desmond Dinan summarizes the effect of the Yugoslav conflict in his Ever Closer Union:
"Far from reflecting well on the EU, the Yugoslav war emphasized deep foreign policy differences among member states and showed the limits of EU international action. More than any other event or development since the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia demonstrated the extent to which 'the dominant foreign policy reflex in Western Europe [continued to be] national, not communitarian.' The EU's ineffectual involvement also sapped popular support for European integration and for the fledgling CFSP."
35
Although when Robert Jervis speaks of "generational effects" he refers to particular generations of people (such as the May 1968 generation or the 1930s generation), we are taking the liberty here of referring to a "generational effect" on a policy, in this case the CFSP and perhaps in extension subsequently on Enlargement. The CFSP was really in its formative stages, even if only as an idea, in the early 90s and the failure to prevent the Balkan Wars has created a kind of a "generational effect" on European decision makers.
The shift in policy, from one of 'sticks and carrots' in terms of aid to one of direct involvement and potential membership, followed the Kosovo crisis and the NATO bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999, but was also motivated by the complete failure of CFSP to alleviate the armed tensions in the region. Part of the 'sticks and carrots' strategy was the July 1996
Community regulation on assistance that created the OBNOVA aid program. While political conditionality 36 was applied to this program, the eventual prize was aid, not membership, and thus the states intended to benefit under it did not take it too seriously. Another attempt was the creation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on May 17, 1999. However, the Stability pact was not even a EU instrument, but rather had "its further development and implementation… vested in the OSCE." action. 38 In particular, this led to the creation of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the actual promise of EU accession to the nations of the Western Balkans. While the SAP itself is not evidence of EU involvement "beyond conditionality" it is a step towards it, as it draws it roots from passive conditionality of pre SAP aid agreements which eventually led to the pro-active involvement of the EU in the region with the potential of EU membership as the "carrot". The history of the EU involvement, and the lesson-drawing dynamic, therefore offers two explanations for its policy making in relation to Serbia and Montenegro. First, it has conditioned the kind of policy EU undertakes (ever increasing in involvement and proactiveness) and second, it has taught the EU a lesson on preserving nations in their constitutive form and shying from solutions that seek to create more independent states, of particular importance to our specific example under analysis. To argue that political/democratic/acquis conditionality explains the EU foreign policy in Serbia and Montenegro is to ignore plethora of evidence to the contrary. Spurred by lesson-drawing from previous Balkan conflicts and realizing the geo-political importance of the Western Balkans to its own security, the EU has taken into consideration the precarious and unstable domestic politics situation in Serbia and sought to involve itself pro-actively and vigorously through a policy that goes "beyond conditionality" as first posited and recognized by Teokarevic.
A very important dimension to this topic is the failed Constitutional referendum in France and how it may affect future enlargement. The EU simply must not forego its aggressive, pro-active involvement in Serbia and Montenegro. With the independence of Montenegro and eventual independence of Kosovo the Serbian pro-democracy government will come under incredible stress and the successful association process may be the only bright spot to campaign under. Reforms, which clearly will induce economic hardships on the Balkan nations, cannot be "sold" to the populace through promises of aid alone as the failures of OBNOVA to spur political change clearly illustrate; they must be backed by a firm commitment to an eventual accession. So far the EU has proven to be up to the challenge of offering "supportive strategies" that go "beyond conditionality". Motivated by carefully formulated and "learned" preferences that lean heavily towards the geopolitical variety, the EU has shed its purely conditional approach and "rolled up its sleeves" in what may just be the greatest, most important and (so far) most successful peace building / democratization project since the end of the Second World War.
